When does aggregation reduce risk aversion? by Chambers, Christopher P. & Echenique, Federico
When does aggregation reduce risk aversion?∗
Christopher P. Chambers and Federico Echenique†
April 22, 2009
Abstract
We study the problem of risk sharing within a household facing
subjective uncertainty. A household shares uncertain prospects using
a social welfare function. We characterize the social welfare functions
such that the household is collectively less risk averse than each mem-
ber, and satisfies the Pareto principle and an independence axiom.
We single out the sum of certainty equivalents as the unique mem-
ber of this family which provides quasiconcave rankings over riskless
allocations.
1 Introduction
We study when a household of risk averse individuals will behave in the aggre-
gate in a fashion that is less risk averse than each member of the household.1
∗We thank David Ahn, Kim Border, and Massimo Marinacci for comments, and
SangMok Lee for excellent research assistance. Our research was supported by the Na-
tional Science Foundation through grant SES-0751980.
†Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology,
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1We use “household” throughout to refer generically to a group of agents engaged in
an risk sharing arrangement. Wilson (1968) uses the term “syndicate.”
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The notion that a group is less risk averse than its members is a very familiar
one in economics. Early arguments for the notion are in Samuelson (1964),
Vickrey (1964) and Arrow and Lind (1970). We characterize the households
that collectively are less risk averse than its members.
We consider a household of individuals who collectively face some aggre-
gate subjective uncertainty in the consumption of a single good, say money.
Members of the household have differing attitudes toward uncertainty, but
all believe uncertainty is probabilistic with a common prior; hence we speak
of risk. The household seeks to allocate the risk to its members to maximize
some notion of social welfare.
Our main results can be roughly stated as follows: Suppose that the
household ranks allocations using a social welfare function 0(R), which de-
pends on individual preferences R = (Ri)i∈N . The sum of individual certainty
equivalents represents the only social welfare function (SWF) that
1. generates households less risk averse than its members (for all individ-
ual preference profiles);
2. ignores risk preferences whenever it compares riskless allocations;
3. is quasiconcave over riskless allocations.
This result is a simple consequence of a theorem stating that (1) and (2)
are equivalent to ranking allocations with a function which takes as input
certainty equivalents, and when maximized over a simplex, has a solution
at every corner. In particular, in any such social welfare function, a riskless
amount should always all be given to one member of the household–but
which member does not matter. This theorem, in turn, uses some classical
results on aggregation from demand theory (concretely Samuelson (1956) and
Chipman and Moore (1979)).
2
The sum of certainty equivalents has a simple economic interpretation:
it is the certain monetary sum that the household would demand for an
allocation of risky prospects. In other words, it is the collective willingness to
accept for an allocation. Myerson (2004), for example, recommends MBAs
and applied decision makers use the sum of certainty equivalents to share
risk. The recommendation is based on the idea of maximizing the collective
willingness to accept for an allocation. Our paper provides a completely
different justification for this recommendation.
In the specialized setting of convex homothetic preference profiles (such
as CRRA preferences), we find another justification for the sum of certainty
equivalents criterion. It yields the most risk averse convex household prefer-
ence, among those which are less risk averse than members’ preferences.
We proceed to discuss our results in more detail.
We suppose a finite set of states of the world. Agents’ preferences are
over state-contingent monetary payoffs, which we call acts. We impose little
structure on the preferences of agents other than monotonicity and a common
prior assumption; in particular, agents need not be subjective expected utility
maximizers.
A SWF recommends a preference over allocations for any given list of
individual preferences. We impose the Pareto principle: the SWF must be
increasing in the welfare of individuals.
We present two new axioms. The first axiom is an independence ax-
iom: the ranking of any two riskless allocations should be independent of the
individuals’ risk preferences. An allocation is riskless when each agent is allo-
cated a constant act–an act whose payoff does not depend on the state. Note
that acts involve monetary payoffs; hence comparing two riskless allocations
involves a tradeoff in which agents receive more or less money. The axiom
states that the tradeoff should be resolved without regard for the agents’ risk
preferences.
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Our final and main axiom is reduction of risk aversion. It says that the
household is less risk averse than its members. The axiom requires defining
a comparative notion of risk aversion. Following Yaari (1969), we say that
a preference R1 is less risk averse than R2 if, for every constant act c and
every act x, when x R2 c then x R1 c. The idea is that if the risk involved in
choosing the risky act x over the certain act c is acceptable for R2, then it
must also be acceptable for R1.
The social welfare function guides the household’s decisions on how to
share risky prospects. In a classic paper discussing the representative con-
sumer problem in demand theory, Samuelson (1956) (see also Graaff (1957),
p. 49) shows that a household which allocates aggregate bundles optimally
according to some SWF behaves as if it is an individual (that is, it has a com-
plete and transitive preference). Our social welfare function generates such
a preference for each list of individual preferences–this is what we call the
household preference. Our main axiom requires that this household prefer-
ence be less risk averse than the preferences of each member of the household.
We characterize the family of SWF’s satisfying these properties. The
simplest member of the family to explain is the unique one which is quasi-
concave over riskless allocations. Under this assumption, the unique SWF
satisfying the axioms is representable by the function, which for any alloca-
tion, returns the sum of individual certainty equivalents. That is, for each
individual’s state-contingent consumption, the rule finds the certain amount
that the individual would need to be given in compensation, then adds these
across individuals.
More generally, we refer to the only rules which satisfy our axioms as
anyone can take all (ACTA) rules. These rules are characterized by a kind
of social utility function. The social utility has the property that for any
allocation, social utility is a function only of the certainty equivalents of
that allocation. Further, the rule is called an ACTA rule as for any riskless
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amount, it is deemed socially optimal to give the entire amount to any one
of the individuals in the household.
Section 2 provides the model; Section 3 has the main results; Section 4
presents results for homothetic preferences, and examples of familiar special
cases. Section 5 provides discussion and related literature.
2 The model
Let Ω be a finite set of states of the world. Acts are state-contingent
elements of R+; that is, the set of acts is X = RΩ+. Let N = {1, ..., n} be a
finite set of agents. An allocation is an element of XN . An allocation of
x ∈ X is a vector x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ XN for which
∑
i∈N xi = x.
A preference relation R is a complete, transitive, continuous, and
monotonic2 binary relation on X. The set of preferences is denoted R.
A preference profile is a vector R = (R1, ..., Rn) ∈ RN . N -vectors are
written in boldface throughout.
Our aim in this study is to understand methods of aggregating prefer-
ences which reduce risk aversion. We imagine a set of agents who reside
in a household and use some social welfare function to optimally distribute
resources. Samuelson (1956) observed that such optimization leads to “ra-
tional” behavior in the aggregate. We ask when such household behavior is
less risk averse than the behavior of each individual in the household.
To this end, we discuss a comparative notion of risk aversion and a domain
of preferences on which this exercise becomes meaningful. For c ∈ R+, we
abuse notation and identify c with the constant act whose outcome in every
state is c. Let R′ and R be two preference relations. As in Yaari (1969),
we say that R is more risk averse than R′ if for all c ≥ 0, {x : x R c} ⊆
2That is, if x (ω) > y (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, then x is strictly better than y for R (xRy and
not y R x).
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{x : x R′ c}. Every uncertain prospect which is preferred to c by R is also
preferred to c by R′.3
A prior for R ∈ R is a probability measure pi ∈ ∆ (Ω) for which for all
x ∈ X, pi ·xRx. In other words, a prior is a probability measure with respect
to which R is risk averse.4 Denote the set of priors for R by Π (R). We say
that R ∈ RN is a common prior profile if ⋂i∈N Π (Ri) 6= ∅. We denote
the set of common prior profiles by CP .5 Subjective expected utility profiles
with a common prior are in CP , as are many other examples.
Geometrically, a common prior profile is one in which all individuals have
a common marginal rate of substitution everywhere along the ray of equal
coordinates. Consequently, common prior profiles are exactly those profiles
for which all riskless non-wasteful allocations of a riskless amount are efficient.
A domain D is a nonempty subset of RN . A social welfare function
is a mapping which carries D into binary relations over XN , the space of
allocations. Formally, we denote the set of binary relations over XN by RN .
Then a social welfare function is a function0: D → RN . We write0(R)
for the binary relation over allocations obtained when individual preferences
are R = (Ri)i∈N .
Example 1: A classical domain of preferences is the domain of risk averse
expected utility profiles with a common prior. We denote this domain by
EU . Formally, R ∈ EU if there exists pi ∈ ∆ (Ω) and for all i ∈ N , there
exists ui : R+ → R which is strictly increasing, concave, and continuous for
3Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) provide modern adaptations of
this comparative notion to general settings of Knightian uncertainty. Their definitions
differ as to the benchmark of “uncertainty neutral” acts, but coincide with Yaari’s when
uncertainty neutral acts are taken to be the constant acts.
4The measure pi can be either objective or subjective.
5Obviously, this set is not a product set.
6
which for all i ∈ N and all x, y ∈ X, x Ri y if and only if∑
ω∈Ω
pi (ω)ui (x (ω)) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
pi (ω)ui (y (ω)) .
A standard example of a social welfare function 0: EU → RN used in
the theory of risk sharing (for example, Borch (1962) and Wilson (1968))
is the utilitarian rule. For any R ∈ EU , there exists for all i ∈ N a
unique uRi : R+ → R which represents Ri and which is normalized so that
uRi (0) = 0 and uRi (1) = 1. We then require x 0 (R) y if and only if∑
i∈N
∑
ω∈Ω
pi (ω)uRi (xi (ω)) ≥
∑
i∈N
∑
ω∈Ω
pi (ω)uRi (yi (ω)) .
Note that, while we have restricted elements of R significantly, elements
of RN obey no restrictions whatsoever (we will later make assumptions on
these elements in the form of axioms). This is because elements of R are
understood to be descriptive, whereas elements of RN are normative recom-
mendations for a society.
3 Results
We proceed to describe the four axioms. The axioms will be equivalent to
a certain class of SWF’s. Coupled with quasiconcavity over riskless alloca-
tions, we characterize the SWF which is represented as the sum of certainty
equivalents.
Our first axiom states that household preferences over allocations should
be minimally “rational.”
Rationality: For all R ∈ D, 0(R) is continuous, complete, and tran-
sitive.
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Our second axiom is natural and requires that the SWF comply with the
(weak) Pareto property.
Pareto: For all R ∈ D and all x,y ∈ XN , if xiRi yi for all i ∈ N , then
x0(R) y (with strict preference if all individual preferences are strict).
Our next axiom is the first that deals specifically with the interpreta-
tion of uncertainty. It requires that in ranking profiles of certain (risk-free)
prospects, the social welfare function should ignore risk attitudes. A con-
stant act c ∈ X is an act which takes only one value. A constant allocation
is an allocation of constant acts. Acts are monetary payoffs, and individual
preferences are monotonic, so all individual preferences coincide over constant
acts: more is better. The independence axiom says that, when comparing
constant acts, 0 should not depend on individual risk preferences. These
do not differ in the comparison of constant acts anyhow.
Independence of risk attitudes for constant acts: For all
R,R′ ∈ D and all constant c,d ∈ XN , c0(R) d⇐⇒ c0(R′) d.
We often refer to the axiom simply as independence. Mathematically,
together with the Pareto property, the axiom allows us to work with a rank-
ing over vectors of certainty equivalents (defined below). This ranking over
vectors of certainty equivalents is independent of the preference profile in
question.
To understand our last axiom, we need to discuss the notion of risk shar-
ing. It is the standard notion of risk sharing, in an environment of possibly
non-expected-utility maximizers (see e.g. Epstein (2001) and Rigotti and
Shannon (2005)).
The individuals in N are all members of a household. Household mem-
bers entertain different attitudes toward risk. We imagine that the house-
hold uses a SWF to allocate an aggregate bundle x among its members.
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That is, given individual preferences R, they maximize 0 (R) across{
x ∈ XN : ∑i∈N xi ≤ x}. Under our continuity assumptions, this risk-
sharing maximization problem is well-defined. Risk sharing generates a well-
defined household preference over acts: a “household preference.” This ag-
gregation results from a well-known aggregation result in classical demand
theory (see Samuelson (1956) and Chipman and Moore (1979)).
Household preferences over acts are given by xh(R)y if and only if for all
y ∈ XN such that ∑i∈N yi ≤ y, there exists x ∈ XN such that ∑i∈N xi ≤ x
and x 0(R) y. This binary relation is the household preference. In
particular, x h(R) y whenever the maximal allocation of x according to
0 (R) is better than every allocation of y.
We are now ready to state our next axiom.
Reduction of risk aversion: For all R ∈ D, h(R) is less risk averse
than Ri for all i ∈ N .
Example 2: Suppose D = EU and consider the utilitarian rule defined in
Example 1. In general, for any R ∈ EU , the household preference h(R) is
expected utility with von Neumann Morgenstern utility index given by
u (x) = supP
i∈N xi=x
∑
i∈N
uRi (xi) .
The function u is referred to as the “sup-convolution” of the functions uRi .
It is easily verified that the resulting h need not have any relation to the
individual preferences in terms of attitudes toward risk.
Figure 1 presents the problem geometrically. One preference R1 is less
risk averse than R2 if, when we compare their upper contour sets through
any riskless act, the upper contour set of R1 contains that of R2. Figure 1(a)
illustrates how the preferences having the U¯1− U¯1 indifference curve are less
risk averse than those having the U¯2−U¯2 curve. Note that there is a common
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U¯1
x(1)
U¯2
U¯2
U¯1
x(2)
(a) Preference R1 is less risk averse
than R2.
U¯1
U¯2
U¯2
x(1)
U¯1
x(2)
(b) Household preference must
contain lower envelope of U¯1 − U¯1
and U¯2 − U¯2.
Figure 1: Comparisons in risk aversion.
prior, indicated by the tangent line. In Figure 1(a), any household preference
satisfying the reduction of risk aversion axiom will need to have indifference
curves “below” U¯1 − U¯1.
Figure 1(b) presents a case where the preferences do not have comparable
risk aversion. In the figure, the most risk averse household preference which
is less risk averse than each individual agent is given by the lower envelope of
the two indifference curves (i.e. by the curve which goes from U¯1 to the inter-
section of the two indifference curves, then coincides with U¯2 − U¯2 until the
second intersection, then coincides with U¯1 − U¯1). Note that this household
preference is not convex, and any household preference satisfying reduction
of risk aversion must have indifference curves below this lower envelope of
U¯1 − U¯1 and U¯2 − U¯2.
For a preference R ∈ R, the certainty equivalent ceR : X → R is
defined by
ceR (x) = inf {c : c R x} .
It is the value of the unique constant act which is indifferent to x; that is, by
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monotonicity and continuity, ceR (x) I x.
6 Critically for us, for a given R,
ceR : X → R is a continuous utility representation of R.
For an allocation x ∈ XN and preference profile R ∈ RN , ceR (x) =
(ceR1 (x1) , ..., ceRn (x)).
Remark: For two preferences R,R′ ∈ R, R is more risk averse than R′
if and only if for all x ∈ X, ceR (x) ≤ ceR′ (x).
Proposition 3: A social welfare function on D satisfies rationality,
Pareto, and independence if and only if there exists a strictly mono-
tonic and continuous function W : RN+ → R for which for all R ∈ D
and all x,y ∈ XN ,
x0(R) y⇐⇒ W (ceR (x)) ≥ W (ceR (y)) .7
Proof: Let R′ ∈ D. Define W : RN → R so that W (d) ≥ W (c) if and
only if
d0(R′) c.
Such a W exists as 0 (R′) is continuous (Debreu, 1964). W is strictly
monotonic by the Pareto property. Now, let R ∈ D be arbitrary. Let
x,y ∈ XN . Then by Pareto and rationality, x 0(R) y if and only if
ceR (x)0(R) ceR (y). By independence ceR (x)0(R) ceR (y) if and only
if ceR (x)0(R′) ceR (y). By definition of W , ceR (x)0(R′) ceR (y) if and
only if W (ceR (x)) ≥ W (ceR (y)). 
Our aim from this point on is to characterize those functions W which
reduce risk aversion.
6We write x I y for x R y and y R x.
7We say a function W : RN+ → R is strictly monotonic if x,y ∈ RN+ and x ≥ y implies
W (x) ≥W (y), and x y (xi > yi for all i ∈ N) implies W (x) > W (y).
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Example 4: One of the simplest examples of a W which reduces risk aver-
sion is given by
W (d1, ..., dn) = max
i∈N
{di} .
This function illustrates some of the properties of the reduction of risk
aversion. The household rule generated by this function reduces risk aver-
sion on the domain CP , but the function W constitutes a very unfair rule.
Moreover, the induced household preferences are typically not convex, even
when the individual preferences are convex. If we denote by Ui (c) the upper
contour set of Ri at c, then it is easily verified that U
∗ (c) =
⋃
i∈N
Ui (c) (this
also verifies that this household preference is the most risk averse preference
which is less risk averse than each individual preference in the household).
The following proposition illustrates that for any preference profile in
CP , any prior which is common to all agents is also a household prior. It
holds because under profiles in CP , constant allocations are always efficient,
and constant allocations are always supported by the common prior. The
intuition for the result is similar to results appearing in Billot, Chateauneuf,
Gilboa, and Tallon (2000), Dana (2002) and Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki
(2008).
For c ∈ R+, the c-simplex ∆c =
{
d ∈ RN+ :
∑
i∈N di = c
}
is the set of
nonnegative vectors summing to c.
Proposition 5: Suppose that the conditions in Proposition 3 are satis-
fied. Let R ∈ CP ∩ D. Then⋂
i∈N
Π (Ri) ⊆ Π
(h(R)) .
Proof: Let x ∈ X and let x ∈ XN such that ∑i∈N xi = x. Then, for all
i ∈ N , as pi ∈ Π (Ri), pi ·xiRixi. Clearly,
∑
i∈N pi ·xi = pi ·
∑
i∈N xi = pi ·x. By
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Pareto, (pi · x1, ..., pi · xn) 0 (R) x. Consequently, by definition of h (R),
pi · x h (R)x. Therefore, pi ∈ Π (h (R)). 
The following result is our main characterization theorem. It tells us that
under our axioms, a social welfare function reduces risk aversion if and only
if it is associated with a function W which is maximized on any c-simplex at
the vertices. This property of W means that in allocating a constant act, all
allocations which give one agent all consumption are socially optimal.
Formally, define an anyone can take all (ACTA) rule as a SWF for
which there exists some strictly monotonic, continuous W : RN+ → R for
which for all c ∈ R+, for all i ∈ N ,
c1i ∈ arg max
d∈∆c
W (d)
such that for all x,y ∈ XN and all R ∈ RN , x 0 (R) y if and only if
W (ceR (x)) ≥ W (ceR (y)). The terminology ACTA refers to the fact that,
for any riskless amount c, an ACTA rule finds it optimal to distribute all of
c to some individual in the household–but the rule is completely indifferent
as to which individual is to receive c.
Examples of W functions generating ACTA rules are the max function
and the sum (utilitarian) function as discussed in Examples 1 and 4. Other
examples include the functions W (u) =
(∑
i∈N u
p
i
)1/p
for p ≥ 1.
Theorem 6: Suppose that EU ⊆ D ⊆ CP. A social welfare function
satisfies rationality, Pareto, independence, and reduction of risk aversion
on D if and only if it is an ACTA rule.
Figure 2 shows the level curves of a W corresponding to an ACTA rule.
It should be clear that requiring W to be quasiconcave pins down the sum
of certainty equivalents. The following axiom contains the quasiconcavity
restriction. It has the interpretation that in an “divide the dollar” environ-
ment, without risk, social preferences should be “fair.”
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ce1
ce2
∆c
˘
(t1, t2) : W (t1, t2) = W¯
¯
Figure 2: Level curves of W in the hypotheses of Theorem 6.
Quasiconcavity: Let c and d be constant allocations. Let R ∈ RN .
Suppose c 0 (R) d. Then for all α ∈ [0, 1], αc + (1− α) d 0 (R) d.
Corollary 7: Suppose that EU ⊆ D ⊆ CP. A social welfare function
0 satisfies rationality, Pareto, independence, reduction of risk aversion,
and quasiconcavity if and only if for all R ∈ D and all x,y ∈ XN ,
x 0 (R) y⇐⇒
∑
i∈N
ceRi (xi) ≥
∑
i∈N
ceRi (yi) .
Corollary 7 tells us that the only “fair” SWF to reduce risk aversion is
the one which ranks allocations according to the sum of its certainty equiv-
alents. When allocating a constant act by the sum of certainty equivalents,
all constant allocations are socially optimal.
We end the section with a proof of Theorem 6.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 6): First, suppose there exists a W as in the
statement of the theorem. We shall prove that it satisfies the reduction of
risk aversion axiom. That it satisfies the remaining axioms is immediate. Let
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R ∈ CP , and let pi ∈
⋂
i∈N
Π (Ri). Let c be a constant act. We wish to show
that for all i ∈ N , {x : x Ri c} ⊆
{
x : xh(R) c}.
As a first step, we show that for all i ∈ N , (c, 0−i) ∈
arg maxx∈AcW (ceR (x)), where Ac is the set of allocations of the constant
act c. That is, Ac =
{
y ∈ XN : ∑i∈N yi = c}.
Let y ∈ Ac. For all i ∈ N , pi · yi Ri yi, and (pi · y1, ..., pi · yn) ∈ ∆c. So, for
any y ∈ Ac there is d ∈ ∆c such that W (d) ≥ W (ceR(x)). Continuity of
W and compactness of ∆c implies there exists an optimal allocation for W
in ∆c. There therefore exists a constant allocation d
∗ ∈ arg maxx∈AcW (x);
d∗ ∈ ∆c. By the hypothesis on W , W (c, 0−i) ≥ W (d∗); we therefore establish
that (c, 0−i) ∈ arg maxAcW .
Now, let x ∈ X and suppose that x Ri c. So ceRi(x) ≥ c. Then for all
y ∈ XN for which ∑i∈N yi = c,
W (ceRi (x) , 0−i) ≥ W (c, 0−i) ≥ W (y1, . . . , yn) .
Therefore, for every allocation y of c, (x, 0−i) 0(R) y. By definition of
h(R), xh(R) c.
Conversely, suppose that 0 satisfies the axioms. W exists from Propo-
sition 3; we will show that the vertices of every simplex maximize W on the
simplex.
Define ∆++ (Ω) =
{
q ∈ RΩ++ :
∑
ω q (ω) = 1
}
(the set of full support prob-
ability measures). Let q ∈ ∆++ (Ω). We shall consider a profile R ∈ EU with
common prior q. Fix an arbitrary j ∈ N . Let Rj be defined by
ceRj (x) = q · x
and for all i 6= j, choose some strictly increasing, concave, and differentiable
ui : R+ → R for which limx→0+ u′i (x) = +∞ and limx→+∞ u′i (x) = 0 (the
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Inada conditions) and define Ri by
xRiy ⇐⇒
∑
ω
q (ω)ui (x (ω)) ≥
∑
ω
q (ω)ui (y (ω)) .
Note that R ∈ EU and that q is a common prior for R. Importantly for
what follows, each Ri is a convex preference relation.
By Proposition 5, q is a prior forh(R). We shall prove that, by reduction
of risk aversion, h(R) = Rj. To see this, let c ∈ X be a constant act. Then
as q is a prior for h(R), if xh(R) c, then q · x ≥ c; consequently xRj c by
the definition of Rj. Hence,
{
x : xh(R) c} ⊆ {x : x Rj c}. By reduction
of risk aversion, we obtain that {x : xRjc} =
{
x : xh(R) c}. This implies
that ceRj = ceh(R); thus Rj = h(R).
For each i ∈ N , define the indirect utility function vRi : ∆++ (Ω)×R+
by
vRi (pi,m) = max
pi·x≤m
ceRi (x) .
Define Uh(R) : X → R by
Uh(R) (x) = supP
xi=x
W (ceR (x)) .
Similarly, define the household indirect utility function by
Vh(R) (pi,m) = max
pi·x≤m
Uh(R) (x) .
By Chipman and Moore (1979), Theorem 3.9,
Vh(R) (pi,m) = max
d∈∆(N)
W
(
(vRi (pi, dim))i∈N
)
.
By the Maximum Theorem, the correspondence δ : ∆ (Ω)× R+ defined by
δ (pi,m) = arg max
d∈∆(N)
W
(
(vRi (pi, dim))i∈N
)
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is well-defined and upper semi-continuous. Define the demand corre-
spondence xR (pi,m) as those allocations which are R-maximal in the set
{x : pi · x ≤ m}.
By Chipman and Moore (1979), Corollary 3.5,
xh(R) (pi,m) =
⋃
d∈δ(pi,m)
∑
i∈N
xRi (pi, dim) .
Now, let pi ∈ ∆++ (Ω),pi 6= q,pi  0. Since h(R) coincides with Rj, if
x ∈ xh(R) (pi,m), then if pi(ω)q(ω) > pi(ω
′)
q(ω′) , x (ω) = 0. Therefore, there exists
ω for which x (ω) = 0. Moreover, for all i 6= j, if m > 0, xRi (pi,m)  0.
Consequently, we conclude that for all d ∈ δ (pi,m), di = 0 for i 6= j. By
upper semicontinuity of δ, conclude that (1j, 0−j) ∈ δ (q,m). Note that for all
i ∈ N , vRi (q, dim) = dim (as vRi was defined using the certainty equivalent
utility representation of Ri). Consequently (vRi (q, dim))i∈N lies on ∆m. As
(1j, 0−j) ∈ δ (q,m), we therefore conclude that W (mj, 0−j) ≥ W (u), for all
u ∈ ∆m.
As j and m were arbitrary, the proof is complete. 
4 Application: homothetic preferences
Theorem 6 gives a family of functions that reduce risk aversion. We singled
out the sum of certainty equivalents based on quasiconcavity. Here we provide
another justification, one that holds for profiles of homothetic preferences.
The maximum function in Example 4 is the most risk averse preference
which is less risk averse than all individual preferences. As we remarked, this
rule may in general induce non-convex household preferences even when all
individual preferences are convex: see Figure 1(b).
Here we study the most risk averse convex preference which is less risk
averse than all individual preferences for convex individual preferences. We
show that, for profiles of convex and homothetic preferences, the sum of
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certainty equivalents gives the most risk averse convex preference that is less
risk averse than members’ preferences.
In Figure 1(b), the most risk averse convex household preference relation
is given by the convex hull of the two upper contour sets. If we denote the
upper contour set of agent i’s preference at c as Ui (c), the upper contour set
of the household preference at c is
co
⋃
i∈N
Ui (c),
the closed convex hull of the union of the individual upper contour sets. We
shall prove this below.
Say a preference R ∈ R is homothetic if for all x, y ∈ X and all α > 0,
xR y =⇒ (αx)R (αy). Denote the set of homothetic and convex preferences
by H.
Example 8: Homothetic preferences are an important family of preferences
in economic analysis. In particular, a large family of such preferences are
given by the CRRA multiple priors agents, who have certainty equivalent
utility representations ce : X → R given by
ce (x) =
(
min
pi∈Π⊆∆(Ω)
∫
Ω
[x (ω)]ρ dpi (ω)
) 1
ρ
,
where ρ ≤ 1. Given a set of such agents with indices (Πi, ρi), the condition
that the set of preferences has a common prior is equivalent to the condition
that
⋂
i∈N
Πi 6= ∅.
Theorem 9: Suppose that R ∈ HN ∩ CP. Consider the SWF repre-
sented by the sum of certainty equivalents. Then the household prefer-
ence h (R) is homothetic, and is the most risk averse convex preference
which is less risk averse than Ri for all i ∈ N .
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The theorem demonstrates that at any constant act, the upper contour
set of the household preference is the closed convex hull of the union of the
individual upper contour sets. This means that the household preference gen-
erated by the sum of certainty equivalents is both tractable and geometrically
simple.8
The proof of Theorem 9 exploits the fact that every profile of com-
mon prior homothetic preferences has, for each agent, a representation as:
ceRi (x) = infy∈Ci x · y, where the common prior pi minimizes
∑
ω∈Ω y (ω) in
Ci. In particular, this set Ci can be explicitly calculated as
Ci = {y : x Ri 1 =⇒ x · y ≥i 1} .
Using this representation, it is easy to explicitly calculate household pref-
erence: it is given by Uh(R) (x) = inf
y∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
x · y.
Example 10: Multiple priors: Suppose that for all i ∈ N , ceRi (x) =
minpi∈Πi⊆∆(Ω) pi · x. Then x h(R) y ⇐⇒ min
pi∈
⋂
Πi+RΩ+
pi · x ≥
min
pi∈
⋂
Πi+RΩ+
pi · y.
Example 11: CRRA expected utility maximizers: Suppose that for all i ∈
N , ceRi (x) =
(∫
Ω
[x (ω)]ρi dpi (ω)
) 1
ρi for ρi ∈ [0, 1]. Then
xh(R)y ⇐⇒
(∫
Ω
[x (ω)]maxi∈N ρi dpi (ω)
)1/maxi∈N ρi
≥
(∫
Ω
[y (ω)]maxi∈N ρi dpi (ω)
)1/maxi∈N ρi
.
We end this section with a proof of Theorem 9
8There is a similar result in the theory of international trade, on the maximization of
profits under constant returns to scale and more than one industry. Lerner (1934) and
Chipman (1966) present a “diagrammatic” argument.
19
Proof (Proof of Theorem 9): The following two lemmas are well-
known, but we reproduce them here for completeness.
Lemma 12: If R ∈ H, then the function ceR : X → R is a utility
representation for R which is homogeneous of degree one.
Proof: Recall
ceR (x) = inf {c : c R x} .
To see that the certainty equivalent is homogeneous, let x ∈ X and α > 0.
Then
ceR (αx) = inf {αc : αc R αx}
= α inf {c : αc R αx}
= α inf {c : c R x}
= αceR (x) ,
where the second to last equality holds by homotheticity. 
Lemma 13: If u is monotone, homogeneous of degree one, and quasi-
concave, then it is concave.
Proof: Let x, y ∈ X and α ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose without loss of generality that
u (y) ≥ u (x). If u (x) = 0, then by monotonicity,
u (αx+ (1− α) y) ≥ u ((1− α) y)
= (1− α)u (y) = αu (x) + (1− α)u (y) ,
verifying concavity. Otherwise, suppose u (x) > 0. Then
αu (x) + (1− α)u (y)
=
[(
α
α + (1− α) u(y)
u(x)
)
u (x) +
(1− α) u(y)
u(x)
α + (1− α) u(y)
u(x)
u
(
u (x)
u (y)
y
)]
×
[
α + (1− α) u (y)
u (x)
]
.
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Note now that u (x) = u(x)
u(y)
u (y) = u
(
u(x)
u(y)
y
)
, so that by quasiconcavity,
≤ u (x)
[
α + (1− α) u (y)
u (x)
]
= αu (x) + (1− α)u (y) ,
verifying concavity. 
Let R ∈ HN ∩ CP . By Lemmas 12 and 13, the certainty equivalent
function ceRi : X → R is homogeneous and concave. Moreover, for all
constant acts c, ceRi (c) = c. Extend ceRi to all of RΩ by defining
ce′Ri (x) =
{
ceRi (x) if x ≥ 0
−∞ otherwise .
The function ce′Ri is concave, monotonic, and upper semicontinuous. Its
conjugate,
(
ce′Ri
)∗
: RN → R is defined by(
ce′Ri
)∗
(x) = inf
y∈RΩ
x · y − ce′Ri (y) .
It is well-known that this function is itself concave and that there is a
nonempty, closed, convex, upper comprehensive9 set Ci ⊆ RN+ for which
(
ce′Ri
)∗
(x) =
{
0 if x ∈ Ci
−∞ otherwise.
}
.
Moreover,
ce′Ri (x) = infy∈Ci
x · y.
(See, Rockafellar (1970) Theorem 12.2, Theorem 13.2 and Corollary 13.2.1).
Now, let pi be a common prior for the profile R. We claim that pi ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
and moreover that pi lies on the boundary (has minimal sum) of each Ci.
9That is, if x ∈ C and y ≥ x, then y ∈ C.
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To see this, note that for each i and each constant act c, ce′Ri (c) = c, so
1 = ce′Ri(1) = infy∈Ci 1 · y = infy∈Ci
∑
ω y(ω). Now, suppose that pi /∈ Ci
for some Ci. In particular, by a standard separation argument, there exists
x ∈ RN+\ {0} for which pi · x < infy∈Ci y · x. Let c be a real number for
which pi · x < c < infy∈Ci y · x = ceRi(x). But then x Ri c, while pi · x < c,
contradicting the fact that pi is a prior for Ri.
Now consider the function defined on X for which
Uh(R) (x) = maxP
xi=x
∑
ceRi (xi) .
Clearly, this function can also be defined on all of RΩ, so that
U ′h(R) (x) = maxP
xi=x
∑
ce′Ri (xi) .
Moreover, it is easy to see, that since U ′h(R) takes infinite values outside of
X, for x ∈ X,
Uh(R) (x) = U
′
h(R) (x) .
Finally, as U ′h(R) is the sup-convolution of the functions
(
ce′Ri
)
i∈N , we con-
clude that the conjugate(
U ′h(R)
)∗
(x) = inf
y∈RN
x · y − U ′h(R) (y)
is given by (
U ′h(R)
)∗
(x) =
∑
i∈N
(
ce′Ri (x)
)∗
=
 0 if x ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
−∞ otherwise.
 .
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See Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 16.4 and Corollary 16.4.1. Consequently,
U ′h(R) (x) = inf
y∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
x · y.
Importantly for these arguments,
⋂
i∈N
Ci 6= ∅, as each Ci is upper comprehen-
sive and contains pi. Hence, we conclude that household preference h(R) is
represented by
xh(R) z ⇐⇒ inf
y∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
x · y ≥ inf
y∈
⋂
N
Ci
z · y,
where for all i ∈ N ,
x Ri z ⇐⇒ inf
y∈Ci
x · y ≥ inf
y∈Ci
z · y.
Clearly, then, h(R) is homothetic. To see that it is the most risk averse
convex preference which is less risk averse than each individual preference,
let c be a constant act. Note that pi ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci and also lies on the boundary
of
⋂
i∈N
Ci (it minimizes
∑
y (ω) across y ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci). Consequently for any
constant act c,
c = c
∑
ω∈Ω
pi(ω)
= c inf
y∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
∑
ω∈Ω
y(ω)
= inf
y∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
c · y
We will show that for any c,{
x : xh(R) c} = co ⋃
i∈N
{x : x Ri c},
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which will verify the result. So first, we show that for all i ∈ N , {x : x Ri c} ⊆{
x : x h (R) c}. Note that xRi c implies that for all y ∈ Ci, x · y ≥ c which
implies that for all y ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci, x · y ≥ c, which implies that x h (R) c. We
therefore know that
co
⋃
i∈N
{x : x Ri c} ⊆
{
x : xh(R) c}
as h(R) is upper semicontinuous and convex. Suppose now that there
exists w ∈ X such that w h (R) c, and for which w /∈ co
⋃
i∈N
{x : x Ri c}. In
particular, by a standard separation argument, there exists y for which, when
normalized, y ·w < c ≤ y ·x for all i and all xRic. We claim that for all i ∈ N ,
y ∈ Ci; otherwise, there would exist a separating vector (again nonnegative
and normalized) z for which y · z < c < infy′∈Ci y′ · z. But then z Ri c and
y · z < c, contradicting y · x ≥ c for all x Ri c. Consequently, y ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci.
Therefore, inf
y∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
y · w < c, so that c h (R)w, a contradiction. 
5 Discussion
5.1 Related literature
There is a vast literature on risk-sharing in economics. Seminal papers dis-
cussing optimal risk sharing include Borch (1962) and Wilson (1968) (see
also Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon (2000)). Under the assumption that all
agents are subjective expected utility maximizers, they determine that, under
certain conditions (risk aversion or a continuum of states) all Pareto optimal
allocations can be obtained by maximizing a weighted sum of subjective ex-
pected utilities.10 A central result of Wilson (1968) is that the risk tolerance
10In particular, under these assumptions, Pareto optimal allocations satisfy what Gollier
(2001) terms the “mutuality” principle–consumption of each individual depends only on
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of household preference is the sum of risk tolerances of each individual at the
optimal household consumption.11
We present our results in a framework with general “non-expected util-
ity” preferences. Our theorem is general enough to apply to most decision
theoretic models existing in the literature, including (but not limited to)
Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Machina and Schmeidler
(1992), Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), Maccheroni, Marinacci,
and Rustichini (2006), Siniscalchi (2007), Ergin and Gul (2008), Cerreia-
Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2008), and Seo (2008). In
the paper, we have used the expression “risk aversion,” although probabil-
ities here could obviously be taken to be subjective (and common). In this
sense, we operate in a general framework of Knightian uncertainty.
The results hold when we restrict the domain to subjective expected
utility preferences, preference profiles in EU : this should be clear from the
statements and proofs in Section 3. The results are also novel as results about
EU ; but no additional insights or simplifications are gained from presenting
them as results about EU .
Our work differs from previous studies concerning risk in that it is norma-
tive. Most previous studies seek to explain behavioral phenomena in markets,
for example see Dow and Werlang (1992), Epstein and Wang (1994), Epstein
(2001), Rigotti and Shannon (2005) and Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki
the aggregate amount in each state. As the sum of certainty equivalents satisfies the
Pareto principle, any allocation it recommends is Pareto optimal and hence satisfies the
mutuality principle.
11Gollier (2001) builds on this result, showing that if all individuals have identical pref-
erences, then a weighted utilitarian planner who optimizes social welfare given a constraint
on average consumption results in a less risk-averse household preference if and only if the
individual risk tolerance is convex. It should be noted that this is a fixed-profile result:
the weighted utilitarian rules applied to arbitrary subjective expected utility profiles do
not typically reduce risk aversion.
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(2008). In contrast, we try to understand the SWF that satisfy normatively
appealing axioms. In that sense, the exercise is closer to Wilson (1968).
5.2 Conclusion
We study household preferences in the context of sharing risk and uncer-
tainty. We are especially interested in household preferences that are less
risk averse than the members’ individual preferences.
Arguments for reduction in risk aversion are familiar in economics, and
appear as early as in Samuelson (1964), Vickrey (1964) and Arrow and Lind
(1970). These arguments are normative: a collective should behave in a less
risk averse way. The arguments roughly say that less cautious collectives
may reap the benefits of larger expected gains, and mitigate the risks by
risk sharing. The idea that a household should be less risk averse is also
strategically motivated. For example, often in strategic interactions, all else
equal, an agent who is less risk averse will fare better according to all prefer-
ences. This is the case in Nash bargaining (Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson
(1992)), as well as in many other game theoretic models of bargaining. So, by
appropriately sharing risk, a household seeks to become more “competitive.”
Our result says much more than that ACTA rules yield a local reduction in
risk aversion. The local statement would be that the household is locally less
risk averse than each individual at each individual’s optimal consumption.
Indeed, this would be true for any rule satisfying the Pareto property. Our
result is much stronger: ACTA rules generate a household which is less risk
averse than each of its members at every level of consumption.
We introduce two additional axioms: the Pareto criterion and that certain
(sure) acts should be compared without regard for risk preferences. From the
normative perspective, the Pareto criterion is obviously desirable, and the in-
dependence axiom should be appealing. Independence may not be appealing
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in a descriptive setting, in which any one agent can force a “breakdown” of
negotiations; then risk attitudes play a role even when the “optimal” choices
feature no risk (Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992) explain how attitudes
toward risk are important in a Nash bargaining context).
We characterize the household SWF which respect the Pareto criterion,
compare certain acts without regard for risk preferences, and which reduce
risk aversion. The results single out the sum of certainty equivalents as the
unique member of this class which is quasiconcave over certain allocations.
Quasiconcavity, in turn, is a basic fairness requirement.12
Our paper thus provides a justification for using the sum of certainty
equivalents as a guide in allocating risky prospects. The existing justifica-
tion (Myerson, 2004) says that any allocation which does not maximize the
sum of certainty equivalents could be improved upon by an allocation that
each individual agent would be willing to accept more for. This is a simple
consequence of interpreting certainty equivalents as willingness to accept.
Our justification is entirely different, and depends on the desirability of the
collective being less risk averse than household members.
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